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KLEIN  
 
EMANCIPATION UN-LOCKE’D:  PARTUS SEQUITUR 
VENTREM, SELF-OWNERSHIP, AND  “NO MIDDLE STATE” 
IN MARIA V. SURBAUGH 
BY DIANE J. KLEIN* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Maria v. Surbaugh,1 an 1824 Virginia case arising from a suit 
for freedom by the children of an emancipated woman, is remarkable in 
several ways - not least among them Judge John Williams Green’s open 
repudiation of a Lockean theory of property in oneself that many regard 
as foundational in Anglo-American law.2  The case also reveals im-
portant changes in the Virginia legal understanding of chattel slavery 
over the first quarter of the nineteenth century, including its evolution 
from an undoubtedly brutal and exploitative labor arrangement into a 
sui generis institution inextricably linking heritable enslavement to Af-
rican descent itself.3  Attempts to emancipate human chattel property 
(and their unborn issue) upon an age condition greater than twenty-one 
years also raised vexed future interests problems with which these nine-
teenth-century slaveholding jurists were forced to deal.4 
To give away the ending, the children’s suit failed.5  While their 
mother was a little girl, her enslavement had been made terminable 
when she reached 31 years of age.6  But her children Maria, Nancy, Sol-
omon, and Samuel were all born before that happened, and did not ben-
efit from that limitation on her enslavement.7  After three decades in 
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dedicated to the two women who inspired it, and whose work has “bookended” my scholarship 
in this area: Prof. Adrienne Davis, whose The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum 
Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REV. 221 (1999),  has shaped my teaching of wills and trusts for twenty 
years; and Prof. Stephanie Jones-Rogers, whose book, THEY WERE HER PROPERTY (Yale Uni-
versity Press: 2019), rekindled my sense of urgency around exploring the connections between 
the American history of slavery, gender, maternity, and archaic property rules.  
1 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228 (1824). 
2 See id. at 228, 231. 
3 See id. at 236–37. 
4 See id. at 239–40. 
5 Id. at 245. 
6 Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228, 228–29 (1824). 
7 Id. at 228, 245. 
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bondage, Mary was absolutely free - but her four children were enslaved 
for life.8   
The case might seem like a straightforward application of the 
principle (codified repeatedly in Virginia law from the 17th century on-
ward9) that under slavery, the condition of the children follows that of 
the mother - but the Virginia Supreme Court10 saw it as anything but 
simple.  Paradoxically, what Judge Green’s genuinely painstaking and 
scholarly analysis demonstrates most clearly is that a path, and a prece-
dent,11 favoring the children’s liberty and personhood was available, 
both legally and intellectually.  But he rejected it.12  When given the 
chance to choose between a humane and decent outcome, and one that 
more thoroughly maintained and perpetuated slavery, the Court chose 
the latter.13   
Judge Green presents himself as legally compelled to this result, 
his duty being “to ascertain and pronounce what the law is,”14 and “to 
execute the law as I find it,”15 conceding only, in the words of Ulpian, 
“Quod quidem perquam durum est, sed ita lex scripta est” (“This indeed 
is exceedingly hard, but so the law is written”). The high court of an-
other slave state, Tennessee, said of Judge Green’s reasoning, “It is a 
most strict construction, not to say a strained one, in prejudice of human 
liberty, and is in conflict with the opinions of Chancellor Wythe and 
Judge Roane, in the cause of Pleasants v. Pleasants.”16  In that case, on 
similar facts, Judge Spencer Roane had declared, “I rejoice to be an 
humble organ of the law in decreeing liberty to the numerous appellees 
now before the court.”17 
                                                            
8 Id. at 228–29, 245. 
9 2 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST 
SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 170 (William Waller Hening ed., New York, 
NY, R. & W. & G. Bartow, 1823) [hereinafter 2 HENING’S VIRGINIA STATUTES]. By contrast, 
for example, Maryland passed a law in 1664 enslaving not only the children of enslaved fathers 
and freeborn mothers, but the mothers as well. JENNIFER L. MORGAN, LABORING WOMEN: 
REPRODUCTION AND GENDER IN NEW WORLD SLAVERY 72 (2004). 
10 At all times relevant here, Virginia’s highest court was called the “Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia,” its justices were simply referred to as “Judge” and the Chief Justice as “President.”  
In what follows, I will generally refer to it as the “Supreme Court” or the “Supreme Court of 
Virginia,” to avoid confusion. A Short History of the Supreme Court of Virginia, VA. APPELLATE 
CT. HIST., https://scvahistory.org/scv/supreme-court-of-virginia/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2020). 
11 See Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) 319 (1800). 
12 Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 228–29. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 229. 
15 Id. at 244–45. 
16 Harris v. Clarissa, 14 Tenn. (6 Yer.) 227, 242 (1834). 
17 Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) 319, 344 (1800). 
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Judge Roane, like Judge Green,18 was a slaveowner himself.19  
He was nevertheless persuaded by the arguments of his future judicial 
opponent and Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, then-lawyer 
John Marshall, to free the unborn children of a conditionally emanci-
pated enslaved woman.20  Similar arguments were unavailing with 
Judge Green and his brethren in 1824.21  In the tortured reasoning of 
Maria v. Surbaugh we witness a crucial step toward the pernicious legal 
binarism that claims “no middle state between slavery and absolute free-
dom,”22  paralleling the racist “one-drop” ideology applied to persons of 
African descent,23 each no less influential for being fictive.   
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Human chattel slavery - permanent, racialized, and hereditary - 
is in a sense impossible in the fixed and rigid taxonomy of Anglo-Amer-
ican private property law.  As Blackstone says, “The objects of domin-
ion or property are things, as contradistinguished from persons.”24  Per-
sons (natural or non-natural) are, each of them, potential property 
owners; everything else is potential property, to be owned by persons.25  
The idea of human beings as property at all is therefore deeply problem-
atic, a category mistake; like enslavement itself, the individual transition 
from slavery to freedom, individual emancipation without abolition, 
was literally inconceivable under traditional property theory and law.26  
And yet, it occurred - an event whose very comprehensibility revealed 
the monstrous fiction at the heart of human enslavement. 
                                                            
18 John W. Green, Wikipedia.com, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_W._Green (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2020). 
19 Judge Spencer Roane, ROANE FAMILY TREE, http://roanefamilytree.com/Judge_Spen-
cer_Roane.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2020). 
20 Id.; Pleasants, 6 Va. at 330. 
21 See Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228, 241–42 (1824). 
22 Id. at 240. 
23 See Daniel J. Sharfstein, Crossing the Color Line: Racial Migration and the One-Drop Rule, 
1600-1860, 91 MINN. L. REV. 592, 593 (2007). 
24 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *16, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_cen-
tury/blackstone_bk1ch14.asp. 
25 See Property and Ownership, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., https://plato.stan-
ford.edu/entries/property/ (last updated Mar. 21, 2020). 
26 See James L. Huston, Property Rights in Slavery and the Coming of the Civil War, 65 J. OF 
SOUTHERN HIST. 249, 262 (1999). 
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The judges who decided Maria v. Surbaugh thus were operating 
within a complex, internally contradictory legal framework that had de-
veloped over two centuries of slavery in Virginia.27 The law of slavery 
was not static, and varied from colony to colony (later, from State to 
State).  By the 1820s, Virginia slave law contained a variety of statutes 
and doctrines relevant to the question presented by Maria v. Surbaugh, 
the status of the afterborn issue of a conditionally emancipated enslaved 
woman, though no facts quite like it had come before the Virginia Su-
preme Court before 1824.28   
A. Testamentary manumission 
1. Outright 
Freeing enslaved persons by will, also known as testamentary 
manumission, was not unknown in the earliest period in Virginia.29  
However, by an Act of 1723 (reenacted in 1748),30 such private eman-
cipations were prohibited.31  “The law of 1723 forbade the freeing of 
any slave, on any pretense, ‘except for some meritorious service,’ as 
judged by the governor and Council. No longer could an owner manumit 
a slave privately . . .”32  As a result, “[b]etween 1723 and the American 
Revolution only about twenty-four enslaved people were legally eman-
cipated in Virginia.”33  Twenty-four – out of an enslaved population 
numbering in the hundreds of thousands.34   
                                                            
27 Philip D. Morgan, Virginia Slavery in Atlantic Context, 1550 to 1650, in VIRGINIA 1619: 
SLAVERY AND FREEDOM IN THE MAKING OF ENGLISH AMERICA 85, 85 (Paul Musselwhite, et al. 
eds., 2019). 
28 See Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228, 228 (1824). 
29 Linda Rowe, After 1723, Manumission Takes Careful Planning and Plenty of Savvy, 
COLONIAL WILLIAMSBURG FOUND.,  https://www.history.org/history/teaching/enewsletter/vol-
ume3/february05/manumission.cfm (last visited Feb. 10, 2020). 
30 Catherine Wisnosky, The Will of the Master: Testamentary Manumission in Virginia, 1800-
1858 (Aug. 1, 2015) (unpublished M.S. dissertation, University of Nevada, Las Vegas) (on file 
with Digital Scholarship at UNLV Theses and Dissertations Database). 
31 Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) 319, 324 (1800). 
32 Adele Hast, The Legal Status of the Negro in Virginia 1705-1765, 54 J. OF NEGRO HIST. 217, 
221 (1969). Deed of Manumission for Francis Drake, May 23, 1791, EDUC. AT LIBR. OF 
VIRGINIA, https://edu.lva.virginia.gov/online_classroom/shaping_the_constitution/doc/drake 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2020). 
33 Deed of Manumission for Francis Drake, May 23, 1791, EDUC. AT LIBR. OF VIRGINIA, 
https://edu.lva.virginia.gov/online_classroom/shaping_the_constitution/doc/drake (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2020). 
34 See Statistics on Slavery, WEBER ST. U., https://faculty.weber.edu/kmackay/statis-
tics_on_slavery.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2020). In 1750, the Black population of Virginia was 
101,452; by 1790, the enslaved Black population had grown to 292,627. Id. 
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This law changed after Independence.  In 1782, Virginia passed 
“An act to authorize the manumission of slaves,” providing, in pertinent 
part 
. . . that it shall hereafter be lawful for any person, by his or her 
last will and testament, or by any other instrument in writing, under his 
or her hand and seal, attested and proved in the county court by two 
witnesses, or acknowledged by the party in the court of the county where 
he or she resides, to emancipate and set free, his or her slaves, or any of 
them, who shall thereupon be entirely and fully discharged from the per-
formance of any contract entered into during servitude, and enjoy as full 
freedom as if they had been particularly named and freed by this act.35 
This 1782 law also required that persons emancipating enslaved 
minors or persons over 45 years old make provision for their support.36  
A formerly enslaved person over 45 was both rare and “old”; life expec-
tancy for enslaved women ranged from 18 to 38,37 and for enslaved peo-
ple overall, about 40,38 although some evidence suggests there were 
more enslaved centenarians than White ones.39 
Some of the “Founding Fathers” took advantage of this restored 
opportunity.  For example, Thomas Jefferson freed five enslaved men 
by his will, Joseph Fossett, Burwell Colbert, and John, Madison, and 
Eston Hemmings, the last and youngest of whom was 18 at the death of 
Jefferson (their probable father) on July 4, 1826.40   
2. Emancipation in futuro: postponed and conditional 
manumission 
But not all manumissions, even testamentary ones, took effect 
immediately.  For example, George Washington’s 1799 will freed the 
                                                            
35 11 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE 
FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 39–40 (William Waller Hening ed., 
Richmond, Va. George Cochran, 1823). [hereinafter 11 HENING’S VIRGINIA STATUTES). 
36 Id. 
37 What was Life Like Under Slavery, DIGITAL HIST. (2019), http://www.digitalhis-
tory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=2&psid=3040; Life Expectancy and Mortality Rates, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/applied-and-social-sciences-
magazines/life-expectancy-and-mortality-rates (last updated Mar. 17, 2020); see also Maris A. 
Vinovskis, The Demography of the Slave Population in Antebellum America, 5 J. of Disciplinary 
Hist. 459, 463–64 (1975). 
38 Slave Health on Plantations in the United States, WIKIPEDIA.COM, https://en.wikipe-
dia.org/wiki/Slave_health_on_plantations_in_the_United_States (last visited Feb. 10, 2020). 
39 See Health History: Health and Longevity Since the Mid-19th Century, STANFORD SCH. OF 
MED., https://geriatrics.stanford.edu/ethnomed/african_american/fund/health_history/longev-
ity.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2020). 
40 Slaves Who Gained Freedom, THE JEFFERSON MONTICELLO, https://www.monti-
cello.org/site/research-and-collections/slaves-who-gained-freedom (last visited Mar. 26, 2020). 
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123 persons enslaved at Mount Vernon who belonged to him (of the 
total of 317) - but not until the death of his wife, Martha.41  Martha also 
had a life interest in 153 “dower slaves” she received as the widow of 
Daniel Parke Custis, who would go back to the Custis family upon her 
death.42   
Postponed manumissions were inherently conditional. Whether 
emancipation depended upon the enslaved person’s attainment of a par-
ticular age, or upon outliving another person (like a widow), it could 
never be known in advance whether the enslaved person would live long 
enough to reach freedom. Perhaps to avoid conflicts with the support 
provisions of the 1782 law, testamentary manumissions, especially of 
minors, often did not take effect until the enslaved persons reached spec-
ified ages.43  Further complicating matters, some persons “emancipated 
in futuro”44 were or grew into fertile women of childbearing age, who 
gave birth to children while still enslaved themselves on unfulfilled 
emancipation conditions.45   
Such was the situation of little Mary, born in 1787 and be-
queathed in 1790, upon the condition that she be emancipated only 
many years later.46  And such were the circumstances under which 
Mary’s children, Maria, Nancy, Solomon, and Samuel, the plaintiffs in 
Maria v. Surbaugh, came into the world.47 
B. Partus sequitur ventrem and the doctrine of increase: one rule or 
two? 
In 1662, long before Mary’s own birth, Virginia had enacted a 
statute under the heading, “Negro womens [sic] children to serve ac-
cording to the condition of the mother,” providing that, 
                                                            
41 A Decision to Free His Slaves, George WASHINGTON’S MOUNT VERNON, 
https://www.mountvernon.org/george-washington/slavery/washingtons-1799-will (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2020). In fact, she emancipated them by deed in 1801, perhaps because she did not 
need their labor, and perhaps for fear of her own safety. Id. Another 41 enslaved persons were 
rented from a neighbor and daughter-in-law of Martha’s. Id.  She died in 1802.  The Deaths of 
George & Martha, GEORGE WASHINGTON’S MOUNT VERNON, 
https://www.mountvernon.org/george-washington/martha-washington/the-deaths-of-george-
martha/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2020). 
42 A Decision to Free His Slaves, supra note 41. 
43 See id. at 27. 
44 Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228, 244 (1824). 
45 Id. at 228. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
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Whereas some doubts have arisen whether children got by any 
Englishman upon a negro woman should be slaves or free, Be it there-
fore enacted and declared by this present grand assembly, that all chil-
dren borne in this country [shall be] held bond or free only according to 
the condition of the mother . . .48   
This rule, “contradicting the rule of the common law”49 which 
conferred status based on paternity, was carried forward by subsequent 
statutes, last enacted in 1753, and still in effect at the time of Maria v. 
Surbaugh.50  This Virginia rule is reminiscent of another older and more 
general rule of property law as it applies to animals, known as the “doc-
trine (or rule) of increase.”51  This ancient and near-universal rule52 as-
signs ownership of newborn animals to the person who owns the mother 
(“newborn animals belong to the person who owns the newborn’s 
mother”53).54  This rule was already well-enough established in English 
common law by the Tudor period that it was notable when an exception 
was made to it, in a 1592 case about the disputed ownership of cygnets 
(baby swans),55 memorable also for the colorful commentary provided 
by Lord Coke in the early 1600s.56 
Confusingly, the Latin maxim partus sequitur ventrem, literally, 
“the issue follow the womb,” was historically used to express the doc-
trine of increase, a rule about animal ownership.57  In England, the 
maxim endured as a part of game law.58  But in slave-owning Virginia, 
                                                            
48 2 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE 
FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 170 (William Waller Hening ed., Rich-
mond, VA, Samuel Pleasants, 1810). “Negro womens children to serve according to the condi-
tion of the mother,” imperfectly quoted at Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 237 (omitting the word 
“only”). 
49 Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 237. 
50 Id. at 231. 
51 See Carruth v. Easterling, 150 So.2d 852, 855 (Miss. 1963). 
52 See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 368 (1954) 
(explaining that the particular rule that the owner of a mare owns the offspring “has appealed to 
many different societies across hundreds of generations”). 
53 Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership. 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 459, 460 
(2009). 
54 Id. 
55 See The Case of Swans, 77 Eng. Rep. 435 (K.B. 1592). 
56 4 THE REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE, KNT.: IN THIRTEEN PARTS, at 85 (John Henry Thomas 
ed., John Farquhar Fraser ed., J. Butterworth and Son 1826) (“[T]his case of the swan doth differ 
from the case of kine, [archaic plural of “cow”] or other brute beasts”). 
57 See, e.g., EDWARD CHRISTIAN, A TREATISE ON THE GAME LAWS 27, 29 (1817) (discussing the 
seventh book of Lord Coke’s Report, which explains that “the general law; which is, that ‘partus 
sequitur ventrem,’ or the whole of the young or offspring belong to the owner of the mother or 
female”). 
58 See id. at 24. 
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this maxim expressing a property rule (who among contending claim-
ants was the owner of an animal’s offspring) was repurposed to answer 
a much more foundational status question: whether certain human be-
ings were property at all.59   
Although he concurs in the outcome of Maria v. Surbaugh, 
Judge Francis T. Brooke60 alone among the panel recognizes and rejects 
this equivocation, and distinguishes partus sequitur ventrem from the 
rule that “all children shall be bond or free, according to the condition 
of their mothers.”61  He does so without citation, but historically at least, 
Judge Brooke is correct that the doctrine of increase “is a rule of prop-
erty, not of liberty,”62 and the rule looking to the condition of the mother 
to determine enslaved status “is a rule of a different character.”63   
Yet Virginia law combines these two ideas, blurring this distinc-
tion between status of the mother and ownership of the offspring, as dual 
aspects of her “condition,” lending a patina of age and legitimacy to a 
particularly inhuman aspect of the emerging Virginia law of chattel 
slavery (a word aptly sharing its etymological origins with “cattle”64): 
the treatment of the enslaved as human livestock, rather than (at worst) 
persons bound in a contractual and terminable relation of servitude.65   
Partus sequitur ventrem as it was understood in Virginia slave 
law thus meant that:   
(1) The issue of an enslaved woman born during her enslave-
ment are enslaved, and are the property of the person who owns their 
mother; and 
(2) The issue of an emancipated (or freeborn) woman (born after 
her emancipation) are free, and are no one’s property66 (although, if a 
certain 1705 act applies, they may be bound to service67).   
C. The offspring of an enslaved woman temporarily rented to another 
Enslaved persons, perhaps even more frequently than livestock, 
were sometimes rented out.68  Renting out a pregnant enslaved woman 
                                                            
59 See Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. (2 Rand.)  228, 245–46 (1824) (Brooke, J., concurring). 
60 A Short History of the Supreme Court of Virginia, supra note 10. 
61 Maria. 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 245–46 (Brooke, J., concurring). 
62 Id. at 246 (Brooke, J., concurring). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 231–32; Chattel, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). 
65 See Hast, supra note 32, at 218. 
66 See supra Part II.B. 
67 Hast, supra note 32, at 219–20. 
68 See, e.g., JOHN J. ZABORNEY, SLAVES FOR HIRE: RENTING ENSLAVED LABORERS IN ANTEBELLUM 
VIRGINIA 28 (2012); see, e.g., 3 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS 
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until after her child was born was a familiar device to reduce expenses 
at a time of her diminished labor capacity.69  As John Zaborney explains 
in Slaves for Hire: Renting Enslaved Laborers in Antebellum Virginia, 
Hiring out slave women was a very common practice among 
Virginia slave owners, and far from being an obstacle to the hiring out 
of female slaves, pregnancy increased a female slave’s likelihood of be-
ing hired out by whites who sought to get the relatively unproductive, 
and relatively costly, slaves off their hands….[T]he hiring out of preg-
nant slave women. . .was an inherent and routine feature of slave hiring, 
and slavery generally, in Virginia.70 
The ownership of children born during that time was not dis-
puted.71  Just as a calf born to a cow on loan to a neighboring farmer 
ultimately belonged to the lender, not the borrower (who had their use 
only temporarily), so, too, children born to an enslaved woman ulti-
mately belonged not to the person to whom she had been temporarily 
hired out (for example, to perform domestic labor), but rather, to her 
owner.72   
The law of Virginia was clear on this point: 
[T]here is now no question in Virginia, but that in rela-
tion to slaves, the increase born during the continuance 
of any temporary interest in the mother goes, as she does, 
to the person entitled to the absolute property in the 
mother, after the expiration of the temporary interest, un-
less otherwise directed by the original owner of the fe-
male.73 
These notions of “temporary” and “absolute” interest applied to 
any present and future interest, not just a short-term hire, but also a life 
estate and remainder, and applied regardless of whether the future inter-
est was reversionary, as the right of the original hirer, or in a third 
party.74  Citing cases going back a hundred years, the Court reiterates 
                                                            
OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 447–63 (Wil-
liam Waller Hening ed., Philadelphia, PA, R. & W. & G. Bartow, 1823) [hereinafter 3 HENING’S 
VIRGINIA STATUTES]; see also Hast, supra note 21, at 234–35 (explaining how slaveholders of-
ten hired out women and girls to other slaveholders). 
69 ZABORNEY, supra note 68, at 29. 
70 Id. at 30. 
71 See CHRISTIAN, supra note 57, at 29; Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228, 246 (1824) 
(Brooke, J., concurring). 
72 See Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 230. 
73 Id. 
74 See id. 
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that “the increase goes to the person entitled to the original stock, after 
the life-estate expired.  And this rule has become common law to us.”75 
And so we have: 
Lemma to (1): The issue of an enslaved woman born during her 
enslavement subject to a present interest are enslaved, and are the prop-
erty of the person who owns the future interest in their mother.76 
This is a default rule; it would also be possible to transfer the 
offspring to the present interest holder, or a third party, just as one might 
transfer present and future interests in other forms of property to differ-
ent transferees.77 
D. The mixed-race offspring of a White woman 
Under Virginia’s partus sequitur ventrem law, the children of 
enslaved women were enslaved, whatever their paternity.78  But what 
about the reverse - mixed-race children of White mothers?  By a law of 
1705, by “An act concerning Servants and Slaves,” miscegenation was 
expressly prohibited,79 rendering sexual activity between White women 
and non-White men  itself illegal.80  But it nevertheless occurred, fre-
quently enough that the law was called on to address the status of any 
resulting children. They were not enslaved, but rather, were bound to 
service for thirty one years.81  Shockingly, perhaps, this law did not ap-
ply only to White mothers who were themselves servants, although such 
women might also see their own indenture extended to provide for the 
child.82  Nor did it apply only to children whose fathers were enslaved 
or in service.83 This law applied even if both parents were free people.84 
 As African descent came to be more and more closely identified 
with enslaved status per se in Virginia, mixed-race persons were at risk 
of permanent enslavement.85  And thus, in 1765, the Virginia Assembly 
                                                            
75 Id. 
76 See id. 
77 See Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 230. 
78 See 2 HENING’S VIRGINIA STATUTES, supra note 9, at 170. 
79 3 HENING’S VIRGINIA STATUTES, supra note 68, at 447–63. 
80 Id. at 454. 
81 Id. at 452–53. 
82 See id. 
83 See id. 
84 See 3 HENING’S VIRGINIA STATUTES, supra note 68, at 452–53. 
85 See Hast, supra note 32, at 234 (“An individual with any Negro ancestry had to be able to 
claim only one Negro and fifteen white great great grandparents to achieve the rights and status 
of a Caucasian”); see also ALEJANDRO DE LA FUENTE AND ARIELA GROSS, BECOMING FREE, 
BECOMING BLACK: RACE, FREEDOM, AND LAW IN CUBA, VIRGINIA, AND LOUISIANA (2020). 
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passed “An act to prevent the practice of selling persons as slaves that 
are not so, and for other purposes therein mentioned.”86  As its name 
suggests, the Act was primarily directed against “divers ill disposed per-
sons [who] have of late years been guilty of selling and disposing of 
mulattoes and others as slaves, who by the laws of this colony are sub-
ject to a service only of thirty one years, after which they become free.”87 
The Act made this conduct, when done knowingly, subject to a heavy 
fine.88 
The second important provision of this law was to cut back the 
thirty-one year age condition to twenty-one for men, and eighteen for 
women - in other words, to something like an age of majority or adult-
hood.89  The longer time of service was deemed “an unreasonable sever-
ity towards such children,”90 who were of course not responsible for the 
circumstances of their birth. 
E. The leading case: Pleasants v. Pleasants 
In 1771, Quaker John Pleasants (born in 1697) made a will be-
queathing his estate, including more than 400 enslaved persons, to nu-
merous relatives.91  The will stated, in pertinent part, as follows: 
My further desire is respecting my poor slaves all of them as I 
shall die possessed with, shall be free, if they chuse it, when they arrive 
to 30 years of age, and the laws of the land will admit them to be free, 
without their being transported out of the country, I say all my slaves 
now born, or hereafter to be born, whilst their mothers are in the service 
of me or my heirs, to be free at the age of 30 years, as above mentioned 
. . .92 
When he was writing, Pleasants knew full well that “the laws of 
the land” did not permit private emancipation (without forced exile).93  
But he hoped the law would change - and in 1782, it did.94  Robert, 
                                                            
86 8 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE 
FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 133–35 (William Waller Hening ed., 
New York, NY, R. & W. & G. Bartow, 1823) [hereinafter 8 HENING’S VIRGINIA STATUTES]. 
87 Id. at 133. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 See Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) 319, 319–21, 334 (1800). 
92 Id. at 334. 
93 Id. at 324; see FUENTE & GROSS, supra note 85, at 88–89. 
94 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, 11 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE 
LAWS OF VIRGINIA FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, 39-40 
(Richmond: J. & G. Cochran, 1821). 
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John’s abolitionist son95 and the executor of his father’s estate, sought 
to emancipate as many enslaved persons as his father’s will and the laws 
of Virginia would allow, over the objection of what appears to be most 
of the rest of his family.96  Robert’s efforts led to the largest testamentary 
manumission case in American history,97 requiring the Virginia Su-
preme Court to determine to what extent this complex devise should be 
given effect.98   
Pleasants v. Pleasants was a big case in every way.99  It was 
argued and decided by some of Virginia’s leading legal lights, and it 
concerned the estate of one of the largest slaveholders in Virginia or any 
Colony (440-500 enslaved persons, depending on the source).100  In 
Chancery, ably represented by the future Chief Justice of the United 
States, John Marshall, Robert prevailed; but before the Virginia Su-
preme Court, he (and the enslaved persons he represented) fared con-
siderably less well.101  The resulting opinion, Pleasants v. Pleasants, be-
came Virginia’s leading case on multigenerational, postponed, and 
conditional testamentary manumission.102  The situation was complex, 
and all of the parties, as well as the judges, recognized that different 
enslaved persons, of different ages and situations, might require differ-
ent treatment.103  But the judges did not agree on how or what should be 
done, and their opinions reveal deep divisions amongst jurists of the 
time.104 
1. Judge Spencer Roane votes to emancipate. . . 
Judge Spencer Roane (1762-1822), decades younger than the 
other two judges who heard the case, was not yet forty and on the bench 
for just five years when Pleasants came before the court.105  Following 
                                                            
95 William Fernandez Hardin, Robert Pleasants (1723-1801), ENCYCLOPEDIA VIRGINIA, 
https://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/Pleasants_Robert_1723-1801 (last updated June 11, 
2019). 
96 See id. 
97 Id. 
98 See Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) 319, 319 (1800). 
99 Hardin, supra note 95. 
100 See Tom Blake, The Sixteen Largest American Slaveholders from 1860 Slaves Census 
Schedules, ROOTSWEB, https://sites.rootsweb.com/~ajac/biggest16.htm (last updated Dec. 
2004). 
101 Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) at 330, 333. 
102 See Hardin, supra note 95. 
103 See Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) at 353–54. 
104 Id. at 343–44, 346. 
105 See Spencer Roane, WYTHEPEDIA W & M L. LIBR., https://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/in-
dex.php/Spencer_Roane (last updated Sept. 10, 2018). 
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his law teacher Chancellor Wythe in the lower court,106 Judge Roane 
took the most emancipatory approach.   
He began with an analysis that assumes it is entirely unproblem-
atic to treat persons suing for their own freedom as claiming a property 
right in themselves.107  As he puts it, “I will also consider, in the first 
place, the claim of the appellees to their freedom, only, as that of ordi-
nary remaindermen, claiming property in them . . .”108 under “the rules 
of the common law, relative to ordinary cases of limitations [future in-
terests] of personal chattles.”109  The Rule Against Perpetuities, in the 
form familiar to us today (with slightly less terminological precision), 
applies to such property,110 with the same results: “. . . where the event 
must happen, if at all, within those limits [the perpetuities period], the 
executory devise is good; and on the happening of the contingency, the 
estate will become absolute, in the remainderman.”111 At the same time, 
Judge Roane acknowledges that “. . . neither the particular species of 
property now in question, nor the case of a remainderman (if I may so 
express it) claiming his own liberty, were in the contemplation of the 
judges, who established the doctrine on this subject [the Rule Against 
Perpetuities] . . .”112   
That the litigants are seeking their own freedom, for him, only 
strengthens the case: “if their claim will be sustained on this foundation, 
and by analogy to ordinary remainders of chattles, every argument will 
hold, with increased force, when the case is considered in its true point 
of view, as one, which involves human liberty.”113  Judge Roane puts 
these persons, who have been objects of property but now claim free-
dom, on the same footing as those who might have claimed an ordinary 
                                                            
106 See id.; Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) 319, 343–45 (1800). 
107 See Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) at 335. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 335–36. Whether enslaved persons are to be treated as real property, personal property 
(“chattels” or “chattles,” the judges themselves utilize different spellings), or some hybrid, is 
not squarely at issue in this case. See id. at 332, 335–36, 339, 347; but see 3 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, 
BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE n. E (1803). Under the laws of Vir-
ginia, enslaved persons were classified as real property in 1705, but re-classified as chattles in 
1727, including for future interests purposes. See Warren M. Billings, The Law of Servants and 
Slaves in Seventeenth-Century Virginia, 99 THE VIRGINIA MAGAZINE OF HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 45, 
61 n. 50 (1991). These reclassifications responded to tensions between the inheritance of land 
together with enslaved persons to work the land, and the sale of enslaved persons to satisfy 
estate debts. See id. at 61. 
110 See Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) at 336. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 340. 
113 Id. at 335–36. 
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future interest in them, upon the happening of the same or similar con-
ditions.114  If a third party could have a valid executory interest in these 
enslaved persons, Judge Roane reasons, so much the more valid is their 
own claim to be emancipated on the same terms.115 
Turning to the substance of the devise, as a condition, “. . . pass-
ing a law to authorize emancipation, standing simply, is too remote, as 
it may not happen, within 1000 years . . .”116  Does this invalidate the 
interest?  Not if it can be read to be limited to lives in being: “. . . such 
a limitation to one, in esse [in being], for life is good; because the con-
tingency must happen, if at all, so as to vest the estate, within a life in 
being . . .”117 Judge Roane is here properly distinguishing between an 
executory interest that vests in a person upon the happening of a remote 
condition (“To A, but if X occurs, to B”) (invalid), and an executory 
interest (whether in fee or in life estate) that vests in a particular person 
if an event (even a potentially remote event) occurs within the lifetime 
of the grantee (“To A, but if X occurs during the life of B, to B [or: for 
life]”) (valid).118  Thus, as to persons in being when the interest is cre-
ated, “. . . this restrains the happening of the contingency… and makes 
the executory devise good, at least as to all, who are within the legal 
limits [that is, of the perpetuities period].”119  Reasoning in this way, 
Judge Roane continues, “. . . the estate [the interest], limited on the con-
tingency (if I may so express it,) that is to say, the right to freedom, was 
good, if the contingency happened within the legal limits, in favour of 
such, as might be in esse to enjoy it, and void, if it happened beyond 
those limits.”120  In more contemporary terms, a condition precedent 
(however potentially remote) to the emancipation of a particular person, 
who is already alive (“in being”) when that condition is imposed, must 
necessarily be fulfilled during that person’s lifetime, or never (with re-
spect to their emancipation), and is therefore valid.121 
Applying this result (“ . . . the limitation can be sustained [the 
interest can be validated] . . . as to such as might be in esse during such 
limits; although it may be void, as to such as might be born, in a remote 
generation”122) to the facts of Pleasants, Judge Roane finds that for all 
those already born when the will took effect, who were alive when the 
                                                            
114 Id. 
115 Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) at 335–36. 
116 Id. at 337. 
117 Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. 319, 336 (1800). 
118 Id. at 336. 
119 Id. at 337. 
120 Id. at 338. 
121 Id. 
122 Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. 319, 338 (1800). 
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law changed and who have reached 30, the emancipation provision is 
effective for them once both conditions are fulfilled, even if invalid as 
to others yet unborn.123 
Because the law changed during the life of many enslaved per-
sons in being at Pleasants’ death, “. . . the limitation over has thenceforth 
become vested, in interest, in all the appellees [the enslaved persons], 
then in esse; and vested in possession, as to all, then, or as they might 
become, thirty years of age.”124  This, then, is the “easy” category, or 
rather, two categories, of emancipated persons: (1) enslaved persons al-
ready 30 years old in 1782, when the law changed, and (2) those who 
have attained that age by the time of this judgment (1800), all of whom 
were (conveniently) born in 1770 or before, and thus, all of whom were 
in esse, in being, when the original will was made (in 1771).125 
As to a third category, (3) those not yet 30, Judge Roane con-
cludes, “. . . their right to freedom was complete, but they were post-
poned /as to the time of enjoyment.126  They were in the case of persons 
bound to service for a term of years; who have a general right to free-
dom, but there is an exception, out of it, by contract or otherwise.”127   
There are two things worth noting about how Judge Roane han-
dles this third group.  The first is that he readily assimilates - indeed, 
equates - enslaved persons (of African descent) who have a right to free-
dom upon attaining a particular age, with (White or mixed race) persons 
“bound to service for a term of years.”128  That approach will later be 
rejected outright in Maria v. Surbaugh, with devastating conse-
quences.129  The second point is that Roane does not inquire or differen-
tiate between those born before or after 1782 (but after 1771), or be-
tween those born to mothers already 30 in 1782, or in 1800.130  His 
perpetuities analysis simply does not make those fine distinctions.131   
The last category he considers are (4) “. . . the children born of 
mothers, so postponed in the enjoyment of their freedom.”132  He is re-
ferring to children born after 1782 to women who were themselves born 
after 1770 (not yet 30 in 1800).133  Judge Roane asks of such children, 
                                                            
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) 319, 338–39 (1800). 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 339. 
128 See id. 
129 Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228, 246 (1824). 
130 See Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) 319, 338–39 (1800). 
131 See id. 
132 Id. at 339. 
133 See id. 
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“Are they, at their birth, entitled to freedom?  Or are they too, to be 
postponed, until the age of thirty?”134  The latter approach would seem 
to validate a “remote” interest in themselves, as afterborn children are 
(of course) not certain to reach thirty within twenty-one years after the 
death of everyone alive at Pleasants’ death.135   
But having deemed their mothers legally identical to “persons 
bound to service for a term of years,” Judge Roane concludes that, the 
mothers being “. . . free persons, held to service, for a term of years, 
such children are not the children of slaves.”136  “. . . [A]ll the children 
born of the female negroes, in question, since the passage of the act of 
1782, are, and were thenceforth entitled to freedom by birth,”137 that is, 
“. . . by birth and not by emancipation.”138   
Judge Roane thereby invalidates Pleasants’ (perhaps well-mean-
ing) testamentary attempt to bind such children to service until the age 
of thirty, deftly avoiding the perpetuities issue, the financial require-
ments of the act of 1782 (including provision for minors, liability for his 
debts or those of his devisees,139 etc.), and emancipating the children - 
all at one stroke.140   
To reach this result, Judge Roane treated the combined effect of 
Pleasants’ will and the 1782 change of law in the most liberatory way, 
not simply as providing for the uncertain possible future emancipation 
                                                            
134 Id. 
135 Worse yet, this possible invalidity might seem to threaten Judge Roane’s validation of the 
gift for any member of the glass.  However, when Pleasants was before the court in 1800, the 
English case of Leake v. Robinson, 2 Mer. 363, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (Ch. 1817), imposing the “all 
or nothing” class gift rule, had not yet been decided, and Judge Roane describes himself as 
interpreting the will “construed distributively.”  Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) at 338. For this reason, 
one commentator’s statement that “A gift to an entire class requires that the R.A.P. be satisfied 
for the entire class, or it fails entirely. . .” is incorrect, or rather, is an anachronism. Timothy 
Sandefur, Why the Rule Against Perpetuities Mattered in Pleasants v. Pleasants, 40 Real Prop. 
Prob. & Tr. J. 667, 674 (2006). Sandefur’s misunderstanding does not stop there; he also sug-
gests the rule of convenience can be used to cure a perpetuities-violating class gift. Id. at 674. It 
cannot.  The rule of convenience is a class-closing rule used to distribute a gift (after the termi-
nation of the prior estate); the Rule Against Perpetuities applies when the interest is created.  
An invalid class gift therefore does not “survive” long enough to be closed using the rule of 
convenience.  Thus, although the rule of convenience was established in time to be used in 
Pleasants, it was not cited because it did not apply. See Andrew v. Partington, 2 Cox 223, 3 Bro. 
C.C. 401 (1791), cited in Adrian P. Schoone, Class Gifts: Time When Class Closes - Rule of 
Convenience, 41 Marq. L. Rev. 205, 206 n. 5 (1957). 
136 Pleasants, 6 Va. at 339. 
137 Id. at 343. 
138 Id. at 345. 
139 Id. at 344–45. 
140 And he knows it. Id. at 339–40 (“The view of the subject I have now taken. . .will supersede 
the necessity of a very delicate and important enquiry: Namely, whether the doctrine of perpe-
tuities is applicable to cases in which human liberty is challenged?”). 
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of one group of enslaved women, but as fundamentally changing - hu-
manizing - their status.141  It is neither radical nor controversial that “. . . 
the children of a free mother are themselves also free.”142  What is radi-
cal - and so controversial his brethren on the court did not so much reject 
as simply ignore it - is the idea that the children of an enslaved woman, 
not yet actually free nor ever certain to become so, are nonetheless “the 
children of a free mother”143 and thus “free[] by birth.”144   
Had Judge Roane’s approach been adopted by the majority, all 
enslaved persons in Pleasants’ estate born before 1770 or after 1782 
would be emancipated at once, and only those born in between those 
dates, aged 19 to 29 when the case was decided, would serve until the 
age of thirty.145  As a perpetuities matter, his reasoning is somewhat 
sloppy - persons born after Pleasants’ death, whether before or after the 
passage of the 1782 act, are not certain to reach the age of 30 “in time,” 
and some of those born after 1782 were born to women under 30 at that 
time.146  Yet his determination not to allow these niceties to threaten 
emancipation is admirable.  He reads the act of 1782 as “. . . authorizing 
or encouraging emancipation . . .”147 and sees the practice itself as 
“countenance[d]” by the “Legislature, at least from the æra of our inde-
pendence,” and regards it as “dear to every friend of liberty and the hu-
man race . . .”148  For his own part, he says, “[a]s it is the policy of the 
country to authorize and permit emancipation, I rejoice to be an humble 
organ of the law in decreeing liberty to the numerous appellees now 
before the court.”149 
2. . . .but Judge Paul Carrington and President (Chief 
Justice) Edmund Pendleton impose servitude and family 
separation 
Judge Paul Carrington (1733-1811) and Judge Edmund Pend-
leton (1721-1803), the first Chief Justice of Virginia, were both original 
                                                            
141 See Hast, supra note 32, at 236 (“The vast majority of Negroes, as slaves, lived under a 
legal-social system which dehumanized them.  Treated as property, they did not even have the 
dignity of family names”). 
142 Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) at 339. 
143 Id. at 339. 
144 Id. at 345. 
145 See supra Part II.E.1. 
146 See supra Part II.E.1. 
147 Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) at 340. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 344. 
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appointees to Virginia’s Supreme Court, named in 1788.150  Pendleton 
was also a Virginia delegate to the First Continental Congress.151  Both 
are much more willing than Judge Roane to impose perpetual hereditary 
enslavement for the first thirty years of life.152 
Judge Pendleton and Judge Carrington engage differently with 
the perpetuities issue.  Had Pleasants’ will instructed his executor to 
emancipate the enslaved persons immediately upon his death, “the con-
dition, being unlawful, would have been void, and the property vested 
. . .”153 absolutely in the legatees to whom the enslaved persons were 
bequeathed.154 A later change of law would have no effect.  However, 
“. . . a condition, that they should become free when the law would per-
mit it, was not of that sort.”155  Still, any future interest created thereby 
is “. . . void; since the Legislative permission might never be given: 
might be afforded one hundred years after; or at any earlier period.”156  
A future interest on this remote condition, whether held by the enslaved 
persons themselves or anyone else, is invalid.   
Judge Carrington, undeterred, says, 
[T]hese devises are sustainable. . .and not liable to the 
rule respecting chattel interests, limited on more remote 
contingencies, than the law allows.  For the subjects of 
the devises are different; inasmuch as in the devise of 
chattels, property only, is concerned; but liberty is de-
vised in this case.  Both sacred rights indeed; but the 
rules of limitation not necessarily the same with regard 
to them.157 
Where Judge Carrington chooses, in effect, to dispense with the 
Rule, Judge Pendleton crafts his own rule: “But I am of the opinion, that 
it would be too rigid to apply that rule, with all its consequences, to the 
present case . . .”158  Instead, he says, “. . . if the [change of law] happens 
                                                            
150 Paul Carrington (Judge), WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Carring-
ton_(judge) (last updated Mar. 28, 2020); Edmund Pendleton, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipe-
dia.org/wiki/Edmund_Pendleton (last updated Mar, 18, 2020). 
151 Edmund Pendleton, supra note 150. 
152 Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) at 356 (Pendleton, majority opinion); id. at 348 (Carrington, con-
curring). 
153 Id. at 351. 
154 Id. at 350. 
155 Id. at 351. 
156 Id. 
157 Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) at 347 (Carrington, concurring). 
158 Id. at 351 (Pendleton, majority opinion). 
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whilst the slaves remain in the possession/of the family, without change 
by the intervention of creditors or purchasers. . . the bequest [manumis-
sion] ought to take place . . .”159  Judge Pendleton seeks to protect those 
who, for example, may have purchased enslaved persons from Pleas-
ants’ legatees, only to suffer a potential forfeiture upon a change of 
law.160  Thus, he believes “. . . it ought to be considered . . .” whether the 
court should, “. . . in equity, prevent the devise of the manumission from 
taking effect.”161  In contemporary terms, we might say that Judge Pend-
leton weighs the interests of downstream transferees who are BFPs for 
value, against a donee future interest holder, as contemporary recording 
statutes do.   
Because Pleasants’ will did not simply direct what Pendleton 
calls a “general” (meaning, immediate) manumission as soon as the law 
permitted,162 the thirty-year age condition, “. . . directing all future gen-
erations of these people, born whilst their mothers were under thirty, 
should serve to that age . . .”163 must also be taken into account.  Judge 
Carrington identifies “. . . the periods, at which, the appellees will be 
respectively entitled to their freedom . . .”164 as follows: 
“. . . all those now above the age of thirty years . . . are to be 
emancipated at once” 165; 
“. . . the increase of mothers above the age of thirty, at the term 
of the birth of the child, are also to be emancipated immediately”166; 
“. . . those born of mothers, not thirty years of age at the birth of 
the child, are not to be liberated, until they arrive at the age of thirty 
. . .”167; 
“. . . and the same rules are to be observed, with respect to their 
progeny, born, during the servitude of the mothers.”168 
Judge Pendleton takes a similar approach, but also believes the 
judgment must take account of that section of the act of 1782 requiring 
that provision be made for enslaved persons who are emancipated after 
the age of 45.169  And thus Judge Pendleton, for the Court, decrees as 
follows: 
                                                            
159 Id. at 351–52. 
160 See id. 
161 Id. at 352. 
162 Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) at 352 (Carrington, concurring). 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 348. 
165 Id. (emphasis in original). 
166 Id. 
167 Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) at 348. 
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169 Pleasants, 6 Va. at 352 (Pendleton, majority opinion). 
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(1) all the slaves of which the testators were possessed as 
their property at the time of their respective deaths170 not 
subjected to the claims of the creditors or purchasers be-
fore stated, and who are now above the age of forty five 
years and their increase born after their respective moth-
ers had attained the age of thirty years (so soon as [the 
appropriate persons] enter into bonds…) and all such as 
are now above thirty and under the age of forty five years 
immediately shall be emancipated and set free to all in-
tents and purposes, in like manner as if they had been 
born free;171 
(2) all who are now under the age of thirty, and whose 
mothers had not attained that age at their birth; and all 
their future descendants, born whilst their mothers are in 
such service, do serve their several owners until they 
shall respectively attain the age of thirty years, and then 
be in like manner free.172 
The remedy crafted by Judge Pendleton (and clearly along the 
lines suggested by Judge Carrington) at least favors the ultimate eman-
cipation of the adult progeny of those enslaved by Pleasants, by sustain-
ing rather than striking down a remote condition of their emancipa-
tion.173  It does so, however, by imposing perpetual hereditary 
enslavement for the first thirty years of life,174 and the forced separation 
of emancipated mothers from their still-enslaved children.   
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
William Holliday, born in 1738 in England, was one of the early 
settlers of Augusta County, Virginia.175  He died in Winchester, Vir-
ginia, in 1790,176 survived by his widow, Jane McClanahan, and their 
                                                            
170 Id. at 320–21 (one of John’s sons and legatees died in 1777, testate under a will with a 
manumission provision like that in his father’s will). 
171 Id. at 356. 
172 Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) at 356. 
173 Id. 
174 Cf. Harris v. Clarissa, 14 Tenn. (6 Yer.) 227, 241 (Tenn. 1834) (stating “if this construction 
be the true one, we have in perpetuity slaves for a term of years”). 
175 William Holliday (13), WE RELATE, https://www.werelate.org/wiki/Person:William_Hol-
liday_(13) (last updated Aug. 29, 2017). 
176 Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. 228 (1824). 
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six young children, ranging in age from fourteen down to three (a sev-
enth child, born in 1788, died the same year as William, Sr.).177  By a 
will made the same year as his death (after the act of 1782, but ten years 
before Pleasants was decided), Holliday bequeathed178 an enslaved tod-
dler named Mary to his second son, William McClanahan Holliday, who 
was just ten years old at the time.179  The practice of giving enslaved 
people to children as gifts or bequests was widespread.180  By the terms 
of Holliday’s will, Mary was to be emancipated upon reaching 31 years 
of age.181   
Fourteen years later, in 1804, William, Jr., sold the now-17 year 
old Mary to one John White, who thereafter sold her to Gilkeson.182  
Gilkeson later sold Mary to Benjamin Carman, who sold her to David 
Surbaugh,183 by which time Mary had had her first child, Maria.184  Mary 
and Maria were sold together to Surbaugh185 (as was common though 
                                                            
177 See William Holliday (13), supra note 175. 
178 Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228, 228 (1824). The court’s use of the term “bequeath” 
reflects the personal property characterization of enslaved persons.  “Devise” is the real property 
term.  The two had not yet become interchangeable as they are today. The distinction was re-
spected at least until the late 19th century.  See, e.g., HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A DICTIONARY 
OF LAW 129 (1891) (“bequeath”); Id.at 364 (“devise”). 
179 See William Holliday (13), supra note 175. 
180 STEPHANIE E. JONES-ROGERS, THEY WERE HER PROPERTY: WHITE WOMEN AS SLAVE OWNERS IN 
THE AMERICAN SOUTH 27 (2019). 
181 Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 228. This age condition may have been intended to track the 
1705 Virginia law imposing bound servitude until age 31 on any mixed-race child of any White 
woman, although that restriction was cut back to age eighteen in 1765 for female children. 3 
HENING’S VIRGINIA STATUTES, supra note 68, at 447–63 superseded by 8 HENING’S VIRGINIA 
STATUTES, supra note 86, at 133–35. 
182 Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 228; This “Gilkeson” might be one of the children of Archibald 
Gilkeson. Archibald Gilkeson, Archibald Gilkeson, GENEALOGY, https://www.geni.com/peo-
ple/Archibald-Gilkeson/6000000001944731587 (last  updated Nov. 18, 2014). 
183 Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228, 228 (1824). It seems likely that Surbaugh is David 
Johann (Zorbach) Surbaugh, a Hessian-born slave-owning cabinetmaker who lived in 
Lewisburg, (now West) Virginia, although multiple records state that he died in 1823, before 
the case was decided.  CHRISTOPHER H. JONES ANTIQUES https://www.chris-
topherhjones.com/chest-of-drawers-with-a-pocahontas-county-west-virginia-history/ (last vis-
ited Mar. 31, 2020); David Johann (Zorbach) Surbaugh, ANCESTRY.COM, https://search.ances-
try.com/cgibin/sse.dll?_phsrc=lgg2&_phstart=successSource&usePUBJs=true&indiv=1&dbid
=60525&gsfn=Da-
vid&gsln=Surbaugh&qh=/PX4JJ//Qmv9/9S8UZHeSg%3D%3D&new=1&rank=1&uidh=000
&redir=false&msT=1&gss=angs-d&pcat=34&fh=1&h=11479650&recoff=&ml_rpos=2 (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2020); Southern Tall Pie Safe Attributed to David Surbaugh, Cowan’s: A 
HINDMAN CO, https://www.cowanauctions.com/lot/southern-tall-pie-safe-attributed-to-david-
surbaugh-3926969 (last visited Mar. 31, 2020). 
184 Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 228. 
185 Id. 
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not universal186); between that sale and Mary’s 31st birthday (September 
1, 1818), she had three more children, Nancy, Solomon, and Samuel.187 
Mary turned 31 in 1818, and sometime thereafter she brought 
suit against Surbaugh in forma pauperis to emancipate herself and the 
children.188  Whether Mary remained enslaved to Surbaugh for several 
years before suing for her freedom, or whether the suit itself took a num-
ber of years to reach the Virginia Supreme Court (or both), is unknown.  
If she delayed, it may have been under the influence of a law passed by 
the Virginia General Assembly in 1806, which provided, inter alia, 
That if any slave hereafter emancipated shall remain within this 
commonwealth more than twelve months after his or her right to free-
dom shall have accrued, he or she shall forfeit all such right, and may 
be apprehended and sold by the overseers of the poor of any county or 
corporation in which he or she shall be found, for the benefit of the poor 
of such county or corporation.189 
Particularly if the younger children were very young in 1818, 
she may have remained with Surbaugh simply to avoid being subjected 
to this law, which was as cruel a form of family separation as the auction 
block.  And should we be tempted to assume that Mary or her children 
would have been ignorant of the niceties of Virginia slave law, the work 
of contemporary historians is a useful corrective.  In suits for freedom, 
enslaved people frequently represented themselves, often ably and 
sometimes even successfully.190 
In the suit against Surbaugh in Chancery, Mary prevailed, but 
the children lost, and appealed.191 
                                                            
186 JONES-ROGERS, supra note 180, at 135–36. 
187 Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 228. 
188 Id. 
189 3 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, FROM OCTOBER SESSION 1792, TO DECEMBER 
SESSION 1806, at 252 (Samuel Shepherd ed., Richmond, Va., 1836). 
190 JONES-ROGERS, supra note 180, at 135–36; see ARIELA GROSS, WHAT BLOOD WON’T TELL: 
A HISTORY OF RACE ON TRIAL IN AMERICA (2008); see also ANDREW FEDE, ROADBLOCKS TO 
FREEDOM: SLAVERY AND MANUMISSION IN THE UNITED STATES SOUTH 35–87 (2012). 
191 Maria, 23 Va. at 228. 
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IV. MARIA V. SURBAUGH IN THE VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT 
Three judges heard Maria v. Surbaugh.192  Chief Justice Francis 
Taliaferro Brooke,193 Judge John W. Green, who wrote the majority 
opinion,194 and Judge William H. Cabell.195  Judge Cabell concurred 
with Judge Green, without a separate opinion.196 
Chief Justice Brooke, the fourth Chief Justice of Virginia, was 
born August 27, 1763, in Spotsylvania County, Virginia, and served in 
the Revolutionary War while still a teenager.197  He served on the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court for the last forty years of his very long life, from 
1811-1851.198  Judge Green was born November 9, 1781, in Culpeper 
County.199  As a young man, he “[s]erved gallantly in the War of 1812, 
and so distinguished himself at the Bar that he was soon made Chancel-
lor, and afterwards was promoted to the Bench of the Supreme Court of 
Appeals.”200  He served on the court of chancery beginning in 1819, and 
on the supreme court from October 11, 1822, until his death on February 
4, 1834.201  The 1830 census indicated his household consisted of him-
                                                            
192 Id. at 229, 245. The opinion notes that Judge Coalter “did not sit in this cause.” Id. at 229, 
n. a1. It appears that the fifth seat may have been empty as a result of the Hon. William Flem-
ing’s death on February 15, 1824. William Fleming, November 26, 1780-February 15, 1824 
(Presiding Judge, July 30, 1809-February 15, 1824), VA. APPELLATE CT. HIST., https://scvahis-
tory.org/courtofappeals/f/william-fleming-1781-1824/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2020); Judge Dabney 
Carr, Thomas Jefferson’s nephew, filled the vacancy left by the death of the Hon. William Flem-
ing. Virginia Historical Society, The Carr Family, 3 VA. MAGAZINE OF HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 208, 
214 (1895). 
193 Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 245; Judges of the Supreme Court of Virginia, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
VIRGINIA, https://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/Judges_of_the_Supreme_Court_of_Vir-
ginia#start_entry (last updated Feb. 3, 2020). 
194 Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 229; Judges of the Supreme Court of Virginia, supra note 193. 
195 Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 245; Judges of the Supreme Court of Virginia, supra note 193. 
196 Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 245. Strikingly, in McMichen v. Amos, Judge Cabell wrote an 
opinion for a unanimous court in which he stated (albeit in dicta) that the child of an enslaved 
woman unlawfully imported into Virginia (and thus free by law) would be entitled to their free-
dom, derivatively from hers, even if she died without any legal declaration of her free status. 25 
Va. 134 (4 Rand.) 135, 142 (1826). 
197 Francis T. Brooke, UNIV. OF VA. SCH. OF L. ARTHUR J. MORRIS L. LIBR. SPECIAL 
COLLECTIONS, http://archives.law.virginia.edu/person/francis-t-brooke (last visited Apr. 1, 
2020). 
198 Brooke, Francis Taliaferro, 1763-1851, SOCIAL NETWORKS AND ARCHIVAL CONTEXT, 
https://snaccooperative.org/view/5792233 (last visited Apr. 1, 2020). 
199 John Williams Green, October 11, 1822-February 4, 1834, VA. APPELLATE CT. HIST.,  
https://scvahistory.org/courtofappeals/g/john-williams-green-1822-1834/ (last visited Apr. 1, 
2020). 
200 PHILIP SLAUGHTER, A BRIEF SKETCH OF THE LIFE OF WILLIAM GREEN, LL.D.: JURIST AND 
SCHOLAR, WITH SOME PERSONAL REMINISCENCES OF HIM 13 (Richmond, Wm. Ellis Jones 1883). 
201 John Williams Green, October 11, 1822-February 4, 1834, supra note 199. 
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self, his (second) wife, Million Cooke (a granddaughter of George Ma-
son), and their twelve-year-old son, John;202 two other White men and 
three White boys, one additional White woman and girl - and 42 en-
slaved people (28 male and 14 female).203 
A. A future interest in oneself? 
In deciding this suit for freedom by the children of a condition-
ally-emancipated woman, Judge Green addresses, head-on, a matter en-
gaged less directly in Pleasants: namely, the nature of the future inter-
est, if any, created by postponed testamentary manumission.204  Judge 
Green queries whether “. . . an emancipation by will is, in effect, a be-
quest of the testator’s property in the slave, to the slave intended to be 
emancipated . . .”205  Judge Roane, in Pleasants, had assumed as much: 
in evaluating the validity of a future interest that did not vest until the 
law was changed and the enslaved person reached thirty, he treated it as 
if it were an “ordinary” remainder going to “ordinary remaindermen.”206  
The entire Court had perhaps done the same, in validating a thirty-year 
emancipation provision, even while acknowledging that “liberty” is dif-
ferent.207   
Judge Green traces the consequences of treating emancipation 
as vesting the enslaved person with a property interest in herself.208  Alt-
hough others owned Mary temporarily, she herself would be her own 
ultimate owner.209  And by that logic, the law would make her the ulti-
mate owner of her children, even those born while she was (still and 
temporarily) enslaved.210  As Judge Green explains, “. . . if the testator 
gave the property in Mary to his son, until she attained the age of 31, 
and afterwards to herself . . . the son was entitled to her issue until she 
attained that age,211 and she then became entitled to them.”212 
                                                            
202 JOHN COOKE GREEN, FINDAGRAVE.COM (2005). 
203 Wikipedia, John W. Green, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_W._Green. 
204 See Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228, 228–29 (1824). 
205 Id. at 229 (emphasis added). 
206 Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) 319, 335–36 (1800) (Roane, J.). 
207 Id.; Id. at 347 (Carrington, J.). 
208 See id. at 338–40. 
209 See id. at 340–41. 
210 See id. 
211 Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228, 230 (1824) (explaining that the testator did not 
know if Mary would live to be 31 and thus fulfill the condition on her emancipation). 
212 Id. (emphasis in original). 
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“But” - Judge Green says - “I cannot assent to this proposi-
tion.”213  He then sets about explaining how to avoid this outcome.214   
B. Self-ownership and self-enslavement 
Judge Green is not about to reject Lemma (1), supra, the modi-
fied rule of increase that returns the issue of an enslaved woman (or 
animal) to the ultimate owner of that woman, rather than any temporary 
hirer or owner of any inherently limited estate.215  Any analysis of Hol-
liday’s devise that emancipates unborn children sub silentio is, for Judge 
Green, a reductio ad absurdum of its other premise: the Lockean idea 
of property in oneself.216  And so he rejects it, stating, “No man can take 
or hold a property in himself.”217   
Emancipation, on Judge Green’s view, is not a transfer to the 
enslaved person; it is fundamentally unlike the transfer of human prop-
erty from one slaveowner to another.218  Instead, “[e]mancipation is an 
utter destruction of the right of property,”219 whenever it takes place.  “If 
it be conditional or future, the condition being performed, or the time 
come, then, and not till then, the right of property is wholly gone.”220 
Judge Green offers three arguments against the idea that condi-
tional emancipation creates a future interest in human property, owned 
by that very person.221  But in framing these arguments, he must negoti-
ate the legal system that supports slavery itself, including practices of 
testamentary manumission and related rules vindicating the property 
rights of slaveowners.222 
Judge Green’s first argument against self-ownership is the prob-
lem of self-enslavement. “If he could [take or hold a property in him-
self], he might sell himself, and, by his own act, become a slave.”223  Just 
as those with property in others can sell them under slavery, it would 
seem to follow that one who owns himself could do the same.  This 
                                                            
213 Id. at 231. 
214 See id. at 231–36. 
215 See id. at 230– 31. 
216 Karen I. Vaughn, John Locke’s Theory of Property: Problems of Interpretation, Libertari-
anism.org (Mar. 1, 1980). 
217 Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 231. 
218 Id. at 230. 
219 Id. at 231 (emphasis added). 
220 Id. 
221 See id. at 231–34. 
222 See Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 231. 
223 Id. at 231. 
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seems so evidently impossible or wrong to him that no further argument 
on this basis is offered.224   
Interestingly, Blackstone (who Green quotes225) offered an argu-
ment against the possibility of selling oneself into slavery more than 
fifty years earlier.226  But Blackstone was an abolitionist, who found it 
“. . . repugnant to reason, and the principles of natural law, that such a 
state [slavery] should subsist any where.”227 
For Blackstone, the self-enslaving transaction is a legal and con-
ceptual impossibility, because the nature of the transaction in the same 
instant reduces the “seller” to an article of property thereby unable to 
receive payment from the purported “buyer.”228  In the Commentaries, 
he explains, 
[I]t is said that slavery may begin “jure civili;” when one 
man sells himself to another. This, if only meant of con-
tracts to serve or work for another, is very just: but when 
applied to strict slavery, in the sense of the laws of old 
Rome or modern Barbary, is also impossible.  Every sale 
implies a price, a quid pro quo, an equivalent given to 
the seller in lieu of what he transfers to the buyer: but 
what equivalent can be given for life, and liberty, both of 
which (in absolute slavery) are held to be in the master’s 
disposal? His property also, the very price he seems to 
receive, devolves ipso facto to his master, the instant he 
becomes his slave. In this case therefore the buyer gives 
nothing, and the seller receives nothing: of what validity 
then can a sale be, which destroys the very principles 
upon which all sales are founded?229 
Though clever, this argument cannot really do for Blackstone 
what he seeks; one might respond that the person selling him- or herself 
into slavery retains their legal personhood just long enough to receive 
(and perhaps transfer) that payment.  Blackstone also fails to account 
for anything even slightly less absolute than what he calls “strict slav-
ery.” A defender of Virginia’s extreme chattel slavery could still point 
                                                            
224 See id. 
225 See Vaiden v. Bell, 24 Va. (3 Rand.) 448, 451 (1825) (citing Blackstone). 
226 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 411–12 (1753), 
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_bk1ch14.asp [hereinafter BLACKSTONE 
COMMENTARIES]. 
227 Id. at 411. 
228 See id. 
229 Id. at 411–12. 
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to practices by which enslaved persons were permitted to earn money in 
their own right, keep some share of their wages, and indeed, purchase 
their way out of slavery.230  What might seem impossible to Blackstone 
was nevertheless quite real in slave-holding Virginia, which tolerated 
these paradoxes in the interests of preserving slavery. 
Regardless of the soundness of Blackstone’s position, however, 
Judge Green’s argument against self-enslavement cannot be Black-
stone’s, which is both too weak (as noted above) and too strong (as it is 
part of a larger argument intended to undermine both of the only two 
possible legitimate bases of slavery).231   
Blackstone’s argument also lacks what Judge Green’s must con-
tain, even if sub rosa: the ineliminable racial dimension of Virginia slav-
ery.232  Self-enslavement, for Judge Green, must be impossible, in order 
that it be clearly foreclosed for White people (while bound labor is per-
mitted).233  The enslavement of persons of African descent operates on 
different, racialist premises, undreamt of by Blackstone, permitting the 
enslavement of those of African descent on terms wholly different from 
the contractual servitude (however oppressive) of persons of European 
(and other non-African) descent.234 
                                                            
230 See, e.g., On Buying One’s Freedom: Sections from 18th-& 19th-Century Slave Narratives, 
NAT’L HUMAN. CTR. RESOURCE TOOLBOX (1500-1865), http://nationalhumanities-
center.org/pds/maai/emancipation/text1/buyingfreedom.pdf. 
231 The other possible justification for slavery addressed by Blackstone is capture in war. “As, 
first, slavery is held to arise ‘jure gentium,’ from a state of captivity in war….The conqueror, 
say the civilians, had a right to the life of his captive; and, having spared that, has a right to deal 
with him as he pleases. But it is an untrue position, a man may kill his enemy: he has only a 
right to kill him, in particular cases; in cases of absolute necessity, for self-defence; and it is 
plain this absolute necessity did not subsist, since the victor did not actually kill him, but made 
him prisoner. War is itself justifiable only on principles of self-preservation; and therefore it 
gives no other right over prisoners, but merely to disable them from doing harm to us, by con-
fining their persons: much less can it give a right to kill, torture, abuse, plunder, or even to 
enslave, an enemy, when the war is over. Since therefore the right of making slaves by captivity, 
depends on a supposed right of slaughter, the consequence drawn from it must fail likewise.” 
“Lastly, we are told, that besides these two ways by which slaves ‘fiunt,’ or are acquired, they 
may also be hereditary: “servi nascuntur;” the children of acquired slaves are, jure naturae, by a 
negative kind of birthright, slaves also. But this being built on the two former rights must fall 
together with them. If neither captivity, nor the sale of oneself, can by the law of nature and 
reason, reduce the parent to slavery, much less can it reduce the offspring.” BLACKSTONE 
COMMENTARIES, supra note 226, at 411–12. The notion of a “negative birthright” is one to which 
we will return, infra. 
232 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 411. 
233 See Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228, 237 (1824). 
234 See Teresa Michals, “That Sole and Despotic Dominion”: Slaves, Wives, and Game in 
Blackstone’s Commentaries, 27 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUDIES 195, 196 (1993-1994). 
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“No man can take or hold a property in himself.”235  Judge Green 
offers no alternative to the Lockean precept he has rejected.236  Strik-
ingly, ownership of persons in general, from which self-ownership and 
ownership of others both might seem to derive, is not understood as a 
necessary premise for the system of slavery, but as a threat to it.237  If 
repudiating this idea has other undesirable consequences - philosophi-
cal, legal, or economic - Judge Green pays them no heed.238 
C. Two paradoxes of self-ownership 
In addition to the problem of self-enslavement, Judge Green of-
fers two additional situations that he thinks contain counterarguments 
or paradoxes arising from the idea of the emancipated slave as a self-
owner.  These are the emancipation of the mother, coupled with tempo-
rary or lifelong enslavement of her afterborn children (“future issue”);239 
and temporary emancipation and a return to enslavement.240 
1. Enslaved future issue of an emancipated mother 
Slave law permitted the transfer of an enslaved woman to one 
person, and her future issue to another.241  But could a slave owner 
emancipate that same woman, and seek to retain or transfer her afterborn 
issue as enslaved persons?  A grantor attempted this in the 1827 case of 
Fulton v. Shaw,242 where the purported restriction on the children was 
held to be void as “repugnant to the grant” of freedom to the mother.243  
As the Virginia Supreme Court there explained, in an opinion by 
Thomas Jefferson’s nephew Judge Dabney Carr,244 
The grantor meant to emancipate Mary Shaw fully and immedi-
ately, and to hold in slavery any children she might afterwards have; and 
the only question is a question not of intention, but of power. Could the 
grantor, after giving the mother perfect freedom, reserve to himself any 
interest in her future children? When a female slave is given to one, and 
                                                            
235 Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 231. 
236 See id. 
237 See id. 
238 See id. 
239 Id. at 235. 
240 Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 235. 
241 See id. 
242 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 597 (1827). 
243 Id. at 599. 
244 Dabney Carr (1773-1837), THE JEFFERSON MONTICELLo, https://www.monti-
cello.org/site/research-and-collections/dabney-carr-1773-1837 (last visited Apr. 2, 2020). 
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her future increase to another, such disposition is valid, because it is 
permitted to a man to exercise control over the increase and issues of 
his property, within certain limits. But when she is made free, her con-
dition is wholly changed. She becomes a new creature; receives a new 
existence; all property in her is utterly extinguished; her rights and con-
dition are just the same as if she had been born free. After thus divesting 
himself of all property in the mother, the grantor could not reserve to 
himself a right to hold her future progeny in slavery. A free mother can-
not have children who are slaves. Such a birth would be monstrous both 
in the eye of reason and of law. The reservation, therefore, was repug-
nant to the grant; and I need not cite authorities to shew, that in such 
case, the grant is good, and the reservation void.245 
Judge Carr, like Judge Green, sees emancipation not as a trans-
fer, but as meaning “. . . all property in her is utterly extinguished . . .”246  
Partus sequitur ventrem operates with lexical priority - first, the 
mother’s condition must be determined, and if she is free when the chil-
dren are born, the inquiry is at an end.247  Any other result is, in Judge 
Carr’s words, “monstrous.”248   
2. The impossibility of temporary emancipation 
As discussed above, renting out the labor of enslaved persons 
was a common practice,249 as was the creation of a life estate or dower 
interest in an enslaved person, with a remainder to another.250  But while 
enslaved persons can be temporarily given or loaned to another (by a 
life estate or a short-term hiring arrangement), there is no such thing as 
a grant of “temporary” emancipation, followed by a return to enslave-
ment.251  “. . . [T]he owner of a slave, having made him free at present, 
cannot bind him to any future service, such an obligation being incon-
sistent with the grant of present freedom.”252 This is another way in 
                                                            
245 Fulton, 25 Va. (4 Rand.) at 599. 
246 Id. 
247 See id. 
248 Id. 
249 See supra II.C. 
250 See, e.g., Chisholm v. Starke, 7 Va. (3 Call) 25, 25 (1801). 
251 See Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228, 242–43 (1824). 
252 Id. at 240. Though Judge Green takes care to circumscribe this to private acts, it is in fact 
the case that by public law an emancipated person could be subjected to re-enslavement. 8 
HENING’S VIRGINIA STATUTES, supra note 86, at 135–3. Similarly, the removal of an enslaved 
person from Virginia, to another state which conferred freedom upon him, followed by his return 
to Virginia, did not result in re-enslavement. See Hunter v. Fulcher, 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 172, 173, 
178 (1829). 
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which the emancipated person cannot be regarded as a particular sort of 
slaveowner, who happens to own themselves. 
What both of these scenarios demonstrate, or at least suggest, is 
that emancipation is different, better understood as a fundamental 
change of status, instead of a (mere) change of ownership from another 
to oneself.  Later Virginia attorneys took note of this analysis.  As one 
argued in Hunter v. Fulcher in 1827, citing Maria v. Surbaugh, 
When we say a person has a vested right of freedom, we use a 
phrase (for the want of one more appropriate) applicable, in its proper 
sense, only to rights of property. To say that a man is free, is not to say 
that he has a vested property in himself, but to describe his status or 
condition. This imperfection of language sometimes leads to fallacy of 
judgment: this court corrected a fallacy of the kind, in Maria v. 
Surbaugh, 2 Rand. 230, 246.253 
D. Children born to a woman contingently emancipated 
With emancipation thus characterized as a destruction rather 
than a transfer of property, and the arguments presented against the for-
merly enslaved as self-owners (whether of a present or future interest), 
Judge Green could answer the question of who owns Mary after she 
reaches age 31 this way: “No one.”254  But Mary’s emancipation is not 
at issue in this appeal.255  The issue is the status of Maria and her sib-
lings, “. . . children born, pending the condition or contingency, or be-
fore the time appointed for the emancipation to take effect . . .”256 
Unlike Pleasants, no guidance is to be found in Holliday’s will.  
His failure to include the familiar formula “and her issue” in the provi-
sion emancipating her negates any argument based on his intentions.257  
As Judge Brooke explains in concurrence, 
If the appellants, the children of Mary, are entitled to freedom, 
it cannot be by force of any thing in the will, under which she has ob-
tained her liberty. It was highly probable, that she would have children 
before she attained the age of 31; yet, they are not noticed nor alluded 
to by the testator. He might have strong reasons for liberating her, when 
she should arrive at the age of thirty-one, which did not apply to her 
children, born before that period. It may have been unjust to his family 
to extend his bounty to them also. However that may be, it is enough, 
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that by no reasonable construction of the will, they can be included in 
it, or derive any benefit under it.258 
As a result, the outcome is determined by Virginia slave law 
alone: “[t]hey must claim their freedom on the rule, that the children 
shall be bond or free, according to the condition of the mother . . .”259 
1. The options 
But what, exactly, does that mean?  What is Mary’s “condition,” 
which determines her children’s status?  Judge Green identified no 
fewer than six interpretations to which Virginia law might be suscepti-
ble in such a case, six different ways of understanding how her condition 
determines theirs:260 
1. If the right to freedom in the mother be contingent, or 
depending upon a condition, the children may be consid-
ered as born slaves, (their mother then being a slave,) and 
not entitled to the benefit of the contingency or condi-
tion, upon which the mother would be entitled to her 
freedom; or, 
2. They may be considered as born slaves, but with all 
the rights of the mother to be free, upon the happening of 
the contingency, or performance of the condition; or, 
3. They may be considered as born slaves, but upon the 
condition being performed, or the contingency happen-
ing, the mother being free, the children may be deemed 
free from their birth, by relation; or, 
4. If the mother is to be emancipated at a future time, the 
children may be considered as born slaves, without the 
benefit of the right of the mother to future liberty; or, 
5. With that right; or, 
6. They may be considered as born free, upon the suppo-
sition that a vested right to future freedom in the mother, 
puts her in the condition of one free, but bound to service 
for a limited time.261 
In interpreting Virginia law, Judge Green states the holding of 
Pleasants this way: 
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That, a testator might emancipate upon a contingency, 
and that the children born of mothers who were to be free 
upon the happening of the contingency, and before the 
contingency happened, were born slaves, and were not 
entitled to the benefit of the contingency upon which the 
mother was to be entitled to her freedom, so as to be free 
upon the happening of the contingency; nor were to be 
considered as born free by relation. For, all the Judges 
agreed, that those born after the death of the testator, and 
before the passing of the act, were bound to serve until 
the age of 30.262 
Judge Green distinguishes Maria v. Surbaugh from Pleasants on 
the ground that the emancipation in Pleasants depended not only on an 
age condition, but also on a change of law which was not certain to occur 
- while in Maria v. Surbaugh, “the right of the mother to freedom at her 
age of 31 years, was unconditional and certain.”263  But what difference 
does this really make?  Both a change of law, and a particular person 
reaching a particular age, are genuine conditions, not certain to occur. 
Interpretation 6, the only interpretation which deems the chil-
dren free from birth, comes closest to the approach taken by Judge 
Roane in Pleasants.264  In that case, Judge Roane described the mothers 
this way: 
[T]heir right to freedom was complete, but they were 
postponed as to the time of enjoyment.  They were in the 
case of persons bound to service for a term of years; who 
have a general right to freedom, but there is an exception, 
out of it, by contract or otherwise.265 
In Judge Green’s version, the precondition on the children’s free 
birth is their mother having a “. . . vested right to future freedom . . .”266  
But this is impossible.  As Judge Green states, “. . . in the case at bar, 
the legacy did not vest until the legatee attained her age of 31 years;. . .if 
she had died before she attained that age, the legacy would have lapsed, 
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and the bequest have had no effect whatever . . .”267 Judge Brooke con-
curs: “If she had never attained that age, it would have been wholly in-
operative as to her, and her children would have had no pretensions to 
freedom.”268  As an attorney in 1827’s Hunter v. Fulcher reiterated,  “It 
seems a solecism to say, that a man actually in bondage, has a vested 
right of freedom.”269  If such a vested right is a genuine condition prec-
edent to the children’s free birth, then, Judge Green seems to imply, 
Judge Roane was in error.   
But Judge Green has it wrong.  Vestedness of the right to free-
dom is not and cannot be the basis for Judge Roane’s characterization 
of these enslaved mothers as women “bound to service for a term of 
years,” because the latter are also not certain to reach freedom.270  
Whether the children of either group are born free thus cannot depend 
on the vestedness of their mother’s future right.271 
Judge Brooke rules this interpretation out as well, but as a matter 
of will interpretation: 
As to her condition at the birth of the appellants, accord-
ing to the will, she was a slave until she attained the age 
of 31. It only declares her to be free when she shall arrive 
at that age…. The idea, that she was free from the death 
of the testator, and only held to service until she attained 
the age of 31, is wholly inconsistent with the obvious in-
tention of the testator.272 
The emphatic language he uses (“wholly inconsistent,” “obvious 
intention”) poorly conceals what is actually the case: that the will said 
nothing on this point.273  It emancipated her upon attainment of age 31; 
it did not delve into these finer points.274  No language can be found 
supporting this interpretation, it is true; but neither can any be found 
negating it.275  As an interpretation of Virginia law, however, Interpre-
tation 6 is not viable for either judge.276 
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Notably, judges outside Virginia read a similar disposition as 
Judge Roane had in Pleasants.  “Had Clarissa a vested right to freedom 
on the death of Thomas Bond? As to [her and other enslaved persons], 
devised for five years to Phil Bond, we think there can be no doubt they 
were intended by the testator to be free persons, held to service for a 
term of years . . .”277 
Interpretation 3 is an interesting (but unlikely) hybrid, reminis-
cent of a device used frequently in the common law of future interests.278  
If Interpretation 3 were adopted, Maria and her siblings would be en-
slaved until their mother turned 31, but at that point, the law would reach 
back in time, and emancipate them from birth (“by relation,”279 what we 
might call “relation back”).  This resembles the treatment of potential 
heirs, in utero upon the death of an ancestor but later born alive, who 
are treated as having been alive all along; and if not, as if they never 
existed.280  During the pregnancy, of course, which of these futures will 
come to pass is unknown; but once it is resolved, this is regarded as the 
state of affairs from the death of the ancestor, giving the heir all his 
rights from that time forward, seamlessly.  Similarly, for what should 
be mostly obvious reasons (including the rights it would confer on the 
formerly enslaved), Judge Green does not seriously entertain this possi-
bility.281 
On Interpretations 1 and 2, Mary’s right to freedom is “. . . con-
tingent, or depending upon a condition, . . .”282 while on Interpretations 
4 and 5, she “is to be emancipated” or has a “right” to “future liberty,”283 
language suggesting a much more robust entitlement on her part.  Either 
way, however, Judge Green therefore must resolve whether this future 
right, however understood, is properly regarded as “. . . part of the con-
dition referred to in the law, . . .”284 which will “follow the womb” and 
apply to her issue.   
This is not simple.  Even if the age condition of her emancipation 
is understood as part of her enslaved condition, how, exactly, does it 
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determine her children’s status?  Is it inherited, and part of their condi-
tion as well (Interpretations 2285 and 5)? Or not (Interpretations 1 and 
4)?  Did they “follow” her into freedom in 1818 (when she turned 31)?  
Or does the age condition (emancipation upon attaining age 31) attach 
to each of them individually (as in Pleasants)?  Or - worst of all - does 
Mary’s contingent emancipation have no effect whatever on her chil-
dren’s status?   
For Judge Brooke, Virginia’s partus sequitur ventrem rule is 
straightforward: “It imports the condition at the time of the birth, in ex-
clusion of any future right to liberty.  It does not include a remote event, 
which may never happen, nor any right of which the mother is not in the 
enjoyment, at the time of the birth.”286 
Judge Green believes more explanation is required.  His primary 
argument that the condition must not apply in favor of the emancipation 
of the children of an enslaved woman “. . . entitled to her freedom at a 
future day, or upon a contingency, . . .”287 is that, the children of a serv-
ant, for the same reason, though born free, would be bound, as she was, 
to service, until she was entitled to be discharged from service. But they 
were not so bound; from which I conclude, that the civil state of the 
children, with all its consequences, was determined by the civil state of 
the mother, at the time of their birth, without regard to the present obli-
gation of a free woman, to serve, or the present right of a slave to be free 
thereafter.288 
On first glance, it might appear that a servant currently bound to 
serve (for a fixed remaining time), and an enslaved woman to be eman-
cipated upon a future age contingency (thus also at a calculable future 
time), are similarly situated, at least with respect to the legal status (the 
“civil state”) of any children born to them during that period.289  So it 
appeared to Judge Roane.290  But Judge Green rejects the analogy.291 
Judge Green’s argument is one that might be called, with justice, 
fiendishly clever.  Precisely because (he argues) the children of a 
(White) servant whose time of service will end, are free (as she is), the 
children of an enslaved woman (of African descent) whose emancipa-
tion will occur in the future, are enslaved (as she is).292  To give the 
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children of a defeasibly enslaved woman the benefit of her condition, he 
reasons, consistency would demand that the children of an indentured 
servant be burdened to bound labor.293  But they are not.294  The similar-
ity of their situation (women of childbearing age bound to labor for a 
fixed time) is not permitted by Judge Green to obscure their racially-
essentialized difference of status.295  One is free and (typically) of non-
African descent (despite being “bound” to servitude), one is enslaved 
and of African descent (despite a contingent future emancipation that 
might actually come to pass).296   
This is the distinction that makes all the difference.  Partus se-
quitur ventrem does not recognize or pass on an indenture, which is 
simply a labor contract.297  A person of European descent, on this view, 
can never be what a person of African descent always and necessarily is 
- enslavable, even if not always enslaved.298   
2. “No middle state between slavery and absolute freedom” 
In thus holding “that a slave emancipated in futuro, continues in 
the meantime a slave to all intents and purposes, [and so] her children, 
born in the meantime, are born slaves, and so continue, notwithstanding 
the right of the mother to freedom at a future time, in which they do not 
participate,”299 the Virginia Supreme Court goes well beyond what 
Blackstone had called “servii nascuntur,” by which “the children of ac-
quired slaves are, jure naturae, by a negative kind of birthright, slaves 
also.”300 
To reach this result, Judge Green has added a further nuance to 
partus sequitur ventrem, one foreign to the world of Pleasants despite 
Judge Green’s attempt to ground it in the 1765 law: the “no middle 
state” ontology of binary and racially-essentialized slavery.301  Accord-
ing to Judge Green, “. . . the policy of the law of 1765 [was]. . .to allow 
no middle state between slavery and absolute freedom, except appren-
ticeship during infancy.”302  As described at Part II.D, supra, a law of 
1705 had bound certain mixed-race children into service until age 31; 
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the law of 1765 cut this period back to 21 for men, and 18 for women.303  
But whether this should be understood as evidencing a general intent to 
establish “no middle state” between slavery and freedom is much less 
clear.   
In the early 17th century history of Virginia, White bound labor 
(indentured servitude) was as economically important as slavery, but 
over time, for various reasons, the former dwindled as the latter grew.304  
By the early 18th century, “. . . slavery had become ensconced at all 
levels of Virginia society and was well on its way to completely replac-
ing indentured servitude as the primary source of bound labor in the 
colony.”305  Where early Virginia had met its labor needs through a va-
riety of forms of bound immigrant labor, to which persons of both Eu-
ropean and African descent might be subjected, by the early nineteenth 
century, White bound labor had almost disappeared, the importation of 
slaves was banned,306 and hereditary racialized slavery had taken over.  
The bond requirements of the act of 1782 reflected long-standing con-
cerns about slaveowners emancipating enslaved people in order to avoid 
providing for their support, and about the financial burden of emanci-
pated persons.307  But as slavery developed into a more fully racialized 
hereditary status, the very presence of free Black people in Virginia 
came to be seen as a threat to the order, as reflected in the 1806 law 
banishing emancipated former slaves.308 
Nevertheless, the idea of persons being bound to service but not 
enslaved remained in Virginia law, and sufficiently familiar to both 
Judge Roane and Judge Green.309  The customary and statutorily time-
limited nature of indentured servitude, which endured for a fixed period 
of time (depending on the age, race, and sex of the servant),310 was fa-
miliar to jurists.   
Other nineteenth century legal sources, in at least some states, 
also recognized the existence of a state “between slavery and absolute 
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freedom.”  In Harris v. Clarissa, decided in 1834, the Supreme Court 
of Tennessee referred explicitly to the “middle state” of children born 
to a woman contingently emancipated.311  Thomas Reade Rootes Cobb, 
a leading Georgia lawyer, reporter of the Georgia Supreme Court and a 
founder of the University of Georgia School of Law,312 stated in his 1858 
work An Inquiry Into the Law of Negro Slavery in the United States of 
America, “. . . where laws have been passed for the gradual abolition of 
slavery, . . .” “. . . the condition of the slaves. . .is changed to a state of 
servitude or apprenticeship.”313 
One hears echoes of Judge Roane when Cobb writes, about pri-
vate emancipation, “. . . wherever the deed of manumission changes the 
condition of the mother from slavery to mere servitude, though the time 
of the enjoyment of perfect freedom be postponed, issue born subse-
quent to the deed, and pending the service of the mother, are free.”314 
Ultimately, however, the “no middle state” approach became the 
law of Virginia.315  But it was no foregone conclusion, and the decision 
in Maria v. Surbaugh played a significant role in furthering it.  If the 
law as Judge Green read it was perquam durum, “exceedingly hard,” 
that is in part because he hardened it.316  This did not escape the notice, 
or criticism, of contemporary antebellum jurists.  The Supreme Court of 
Tennessee, in Harris v. Clarissa, commented upon Maria v. Surbaugh 
this way: “It is a most strict construction, not to say a strained one, in 
prejudice of human liberty, and is in conflict with the opinions of Chan-
cellor Wythe and Judge Roane, in the cause of Pleasants v. Pleas-
ants.”317 
V. CONCLUSION: TWO FICTIVE BINARISMS 
The developments that culminated in Maria v. Surbaugh put two 
false binarisms simultaneously into play: between slavery and absolute 
freedom, and between persons of African descent (Black) and those of 
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European descent (White).318  Each depended essentially upon and drew 
life from the other, and each depended on particular varieties of blind-
ness and denial.319 Thus a sharp and rigid legal distinction was used to 
discipline the unruly biological and social reality of interracial sex; the 
denial of an in-between legal status, after two centuries of indentured 
servitude, paralleled the denial of the reality of miscegenation, even as 
laws were passed to prevent “that abominable mixture and spurious is-
sue.”320   
As for “the favor shewn by the common law to liberty,”321 Judge 
Green sides with “the civilians,”322 Roman commentators on slavery 
law, even while claiming (in Latin) to find this outcome “exceedingly 
hard, but so the law is written.”323 
This “no middle state” ontology also resolved a functionally un-
differentiated category, child-bearing women bound to labor for a fixed 
time, into two utterly distinct and non-overlapping groups: the enslaved 
(of African descent) and the free (of European descent).324  Partus se-
quitur ventrem applied with lexical priority then gives the result Judge 
Green reaches: the children of the enslaved Black mother are enslaved, 
notwithstanding her emancipation in futuro; while the children of the 
White servant mother are free, notwithstanding her current bondage.325  
And even should emancipation arrive for the formerly enslaved Black 
mother, the 1806 law requiring emancipated persons to leave Virginia 
within twelve months, on pain of re-enslavement,326 meant she must 
leave her enslaved children behind to secure her own freedom, a very 
real immiseration engendered by these vicious fictions. 
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